Bar Subject: Political Law

Should the petition for a plebiscite filed by the Sha Group be granted?

• AYes, because the petition satisfied the constitutional requirement of at least 12% of the total registered voters with at least 3% per legislative district represented.
• BYes, provided that Congress concurs with the petition by a three-fourths vote of all its Members.
• CNo, because shifting from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system constitutes a constitutional revision, which cannot be accomplished through a people's initiative.
• DNo, because the power of initiative is limited exclusively to national statutes and local ordinances, not the Constitution.

Under Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and Lambino v. COMELEC, a people's initiative can only propose constitutional amendments, not revisions. Shifting the form of government from a Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system alters the basic structure of government and the separation of powers. This constitutes a constitutional revision, which can only be proposed by Congress (acting as a Constituent Assembly) or a Constitutional Convention.

Are the ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Fernando City valid?

• AYes, because local government units possess delegated police power under the General Welfare Clause to prohibit activities deemed inimical to public morals and welfare.
• BYes, provided that the ordinances were passed following public hearings and approved by the Department of the Interior and Local Government.
• CNo, because local ordinances cannot contravene national statutes, and LGUs cannot prohibit or undo what Congress has authorized under the PAGCOR Charter.
• DNo, because PAGCOR is a national agency completely exempt from all local government authority, including local zoning and building codes.

Under Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, local government units exercise mere delegated legislative power and cannot enact ordinances that contradict national statutes. Since P.D. No. 1869 (the PAGCOR Charter) explicitly authorizes PAGCOR to regulate and operate casinos nationwide, local ordinances prohibiting casino operations and denying business permits therefor contravene a statute and are ultra vires, null, and void.

Is the appropriation law unconstitutional insofar as it gives individual legislators post-enactment discretion to determine specific projects and fund allocations?

• ANo, because Congress holds the power of the purse and may retain post-enactment authority to direct project allocations.
• BNo, provided that the post-enactment identifications made by legislators are treated as merely recommendatory to the executive branch.
• CYes, because granting individual legislators post-enactment authority in project identification and fund allocation violates the separation of powers and the non-delegability of legislative power.
• DYes, but solely because the contracts were awarded to family members of legislators in violation of anti-graft statutes.

Under Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Belgica v. Ochoa, post-enactment provisions in an appropriation law that allow individual legislators to identify projects or allocate funds after enactment are unconstitutional. From the moment the budget law takes effect, Congress's legislative role ends and the Executive's role of budget execution begins. Empowering individual legislators with post-enactment authority violates the separation of powers by intruding into budget execution, and violates the non-delegability of legislative power by allowing individual members to exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged exclusively in Congress as a collegial body.

Is E.O. 111 unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits executive officials from appearing before congressional investigations in aid of legislation without prior presidential approval?

• ANo, because the President as Chief Executive exercises absolute control over executive department personnel and may restrict their appearance before coordinate branches.
• BNo, because executive privilege automatically attaches to all executive officials by virtue of their appointment to the executive branch.
• CYes, because requiring prior presidential approval for executive officials to appear in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation frustrates Congress's constitutional power of inquiry and improperly applies executive privilege to categories of persons rather than specific information.
• DYes, because the President lacks authority to issue rules and guidelines regarding executive privilege or the Question Hour.

Under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution and Senate v. Ermita, the power of legislative inquiry in aid of legislation is co-extensive with the power to legislate, and attendance therein is compulsory for executive officials. Executive privilege is recognized only in relation to specific categories of sensitive information, not categories of persons. Requiring prior presidential approval before executive officials can appear in legislative inquiries frustrates the legislative power of inquiry and is unconstitutional.

May the House of Representatives cite the Court of Appeals (CA) Justices in contempt for issuing a writ of habeas corpus and granting provisional release to the detained provincial officials?

• AYes, because the contempt power of Congress in aid of legislation is broad and extends to members of the Judiciary who interfere with legislative inquiries.
• BNo, because citing CA Justices in contempt for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions violates the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence.
• CYes, provided that the show cause order is approved by a two-thirds vote of all members of the House of Representatives.
• DNo, because the power to punish for contempt is lodged exclusively in courts of justice and cannot be exercised by legislative bodies.

Under the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence, the House of Representatives cannot cite members of the Judiciary in contempt for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions, such as taking cognizance of a petition for habeas corpus and ordering provisional release. Courts are constitutionally authorized to inquire into the legality of detention, and the proper recourse against an adverse judicial ruling is to seek remedies within the judicial hierarchy (such as filing a petition with the Supreme Court), rather than subjecting judges to legislative contempt (Agcaoili v. Fariñas).