A. The President appoints the Vice President as his Administration’s Housing Czar, a position that requires the appointee to sit in the Cabinet. Although the appointment of the members of the Cabinet requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointment (CA), the Office of the President does not submit the appointment to the CA. May the Vice President validly sit in the Cabinet? (2.5%)
B. The Executive Department has accumulated substantial savings from its appropriations. Needing ₱3,000,000.00 for the conduct of a plebiscite for the creation of a new city but has no funds appropriated soon by the Congress for the purpose, the COMELEC requests the President to transfer funds from the savings of the Executive Department in order to avoid a delay in the holding of the plebiscite.
May the President validly exercise his power under the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds from the savings of the Executive Department, and make a cross-border transfer of ₱3,000,000.00 to the COMELEC by way of augmentation? Is your answer the same if the transfer is treated as aid to the COMELEC? Explain your answer. (4%)
Suggested answer only. Not an official answer and not legal advice.
(a) Yes, the Vice President may validly sit in the Cabinet, but (b) No, the President cannot transfer Executive savings to COMELEC, even if treated as aid. Under Article VII, Section 3 of the Constitution, the
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Quick check
May the Vice President be validly appointed as a Cabinet member without Commission on Appointments confirmation?
Article VII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly allows the Vice President to be appointed to the Cabinet without confirmation.
Under Article VI, Section 25(5), who among the following is authorized to augment items in appropriations from savings?
Only the constitutional heads of the three branches and independent Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment appropriations from savings.
Why is a cross-border transfer of savings from the Executive Department to the COMELEC unconstitutional?
Article VI, Section 25(5) prohibits cross-border transfers and limits augmentation strictly to items within the same branch or body.
Can a transfer of executive savings to an independent constitutional commission be validated by calling it aid?
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Which fundamental constitutional principle is violated when the Executive transfers funds to an independent commission?
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Learn more about these topics
1. Vice President Appointment
Under Article VII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet without needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This explicit constitutional provision serves as a specific exception to the general rule governing presidential appointments of Cabinet secretaries. Consequently, when the President appoints the Vice President to head an executive department or housing agency, the appointment takes effect immediately upon acceptance without legislative vetting.
2. Cross-Border Transfers
Article VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution prohibits cross-border transfers of public funds between separate branches of government or independent constitutional bodies. Although the President, Senate President, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice, and heads of Constitutional Commissions may be authorized by law to augment items in their respective appropriations, such transfers are strictly confined to actual savings within their own offices. Transferring executive savings to an independent body like the COMELEC violates the constitutional rule on augmentation.
3. Prohibition On Aid
Inter-branch fund transfers cannot be legally justified by disguising or treating them as financial aid or assistance to an independent constitutional commission. Allowing cross-border financial aid from the executive branch undermines the financial and operational independence guaranteed to constitutional bodies like the COMELEC. Furthermore, such unauthorized transfers subvert the exclusive power of Congress to appropriate public funds and violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.