Following the insistent requests of high-ranking Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) officials, Congress enacted an appropriation law containing provisions that give individual legislators the discretion to determine, post-enactment, how much funds would go to specific Flood Control Projects or beneficiaries which they themselves also determine. Consequently, disbursements were made by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant thereto. During the investigations in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, DPWH officials and some contractors testified that most of the contracts for flood control projects were awarded to contractors owned by family members of, or endorsed by the legislators. They also mentioned that billions of pesos of “kickbacks” were delivered to certain legislators who “inserted” the funds for the flood control projects, which were found to be “ghost projects,” unfinished, abandoned, or of substandard quality. Is the appropriation law unconstitutional? Explain.
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Answer: Yes, the provisions giving individual legislators post-enactment discretion over funds and projects are unconstitutional.
Legal Basis: Under Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, appropriation belongs exclusively to Congress as a body, while budget execution belongs to the Executive. In Belgica v. Ochoa, the Supreme Court held that empowering legislators to intervene in budget execution through post-enactment project identification or fund allocation violates the separation of powers and the non-delegability of legislative power.
Application: The provisions allowing legislators to determine specific flood control projects post-enactment are invalid. Once the budget is enacted, Congress's role ends, and executive implementation begins. Allowing individual members to dictate project choices improperly thrusts them into budget execution.
Conclusion: Therefore, the provisions granting post-enactment allocation powers to legislators are unconstitutional and void.
Quick check
Is the appropriation law unconstitutional insofar as it gives individual legislators post-enactment discretion to determine specific projects and fund allocations?
Under Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Belgica v. Ochoa, post-enactment provisions in an appropriation law that allow individual legislators to identify projects or allocate funds after enactment are unconstitutional. From the moment the budget law takes effect, Congress's legislative role ends and the Executive's role of budget execution begins. Empowering individual legislators with post-enactment authority violates the separation of powers by intruding into budget execution, and violates the non-delegability of legislative power by allowing individual members to exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged exclusively in Congress as a collegial body.